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Negotiation is increasingly viewed as a desirable alternative to courtroom conflict between 
industrialists and environmentalists. The “court battle” is often costly, t ime-consuming, 
uncertain, and all-or-nothing; negotiation promises a cheaper, quicker, mutually acceptable 
outcome. This paper examines the conditions under which there is scope for a negotiated 
compromise; and it examines the conditions under which a negotiated compromise is economi- 
cally efficient. Its principal result is a warning: there is no reason to expect that environmental 
negotiation conducted under threat of court battle will produce a socially desirable outcome. 
8 1988 Academic Press. Inc. 
Mediation should by all means be encouraged. It can have a valid and important 
place in the early stages of disputes that revolve around such issues as the exact location 
of a power plant or dam, or the time schedule an industry might be allowed for abating 
an environmental nuisance.. . . Clearly, the more cases that can be settled without 
recourse to the judiciary, with all its cost and delay, the better. 
New York Times 
31 August 1977 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Quietly, during the 197Os, a change occurred in the way environmental disputes 
were settled. Instead of fighting to the end in the courts, bureaucracies, or legisla- 
tures, environmental groups and their industrial opponents increasingly sought to 
negotiate a settlement in which some environmental damage is accepted in return 
for more extensive environmental safeguarding than the industrialist had originally 
planned.’ 
The disadvantages of the “court battle” are clear. It is costly, time-consuming, 
and uncertain as to its outcome. Moreover, it tends to be all-or-nothing, with one 
party ultimately awarded total victory and the most feared outcome visited upon the 
loser. Against this can be set the equally clear advantages of a negotiated (or 
mediated) solution. It is fast (as speedy as the parties wish it to be), inexpensive 
(relative to litigation), flexible (in the sense that the real, rather than just the 
litigable, issues can be addressed), and voluntary (in the sense of being mutually 
*This research was supported in part by a Sloan Foundation grant awarded to the Institute of Public 
Policy Studies at the University of Michigan. This paper has benefited from the comments of several 
members of the Public Finance Seminar at the University of Michigan during presentation of an early 
version. 
‘This shift is documented in Gladwin [3, p. 2661. 
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acceptable).’ It is therefore not surprising to find that most analysts of environmen- 
tal negotiation sing its praises. It has been extolled as “a positive-sum exercise”3 
and “a much more efficient means [than court battles] of reconciling.. . most 
environmental disputes.“4 Susskind et al. [9] pronounce “that an extra-legislative 
and a non-judicial approach to resolving environmental disputes is infinitely prefer- 
able” [p. 241. 
The role of this paper is to introduce a cautionary note. Examination of the legal 
and economic characteristics of environmental disputes indicates that there is no 
scope for successful negotiation in many circumstances, and, more critically, there is 
no reason for believing that a negotiated settlement will be economically efficient. 
This paper shows three potential sources of failure from the viewpoint of economic 
efficiency. One, negotiation may lead to the wrong (either excessive or inadequate) 
amount of environmental safeguards being embodied in a project. Two, environ- 
mental negotiation may fail to reach agreement on projects that are beneficial when 
judged from an overall social perspective. And three, negotiation may succeed in 
producing an agreement to proceed on a project that is undesirable from an overall 
social perspective. In short, while a successful negotiation must by definition make 
each of the participants better off than the expected courtroom outcome, there is no 
guarantee that such a negotiation will produce economically efficient outcomes. 
The approach of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, a taxonomy of legal and 
economic characteristics of environmental disputes is developed. One set of such 
characteristics is then analyzed in Section 3 as a “basic” environmental dispute. In 
Section 4, three variations of this environmental dispute are examined. One, the 
inclusion of side payments, in either direction, is considered. Two, the assumption is 
dropped that environmental safeguards are available with diminishing returns in 
terms of the environmental damage they prevent. And three, a less extreme 
courtroom outcome is explored. 
2. TAXONOMY OF ENVIRONMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS 
During the 197Os, negotiations became increasingly common as a means of 
attempting settlement of environmental disputes. Innumerable such efforts have 
now been recorded, concerned with a wide variety of development projects and 
environmental impacts. Nevertheless, a taxonomy of potential negotiating situations 
can be constructed by focusing on the legal and economic characteristics rather than 
the material and ecological attributes. Most industrial/environmental disputes that 
lead either to court resolution5 or to negotiated settlement can be categorized in 
terms of four features of the conflict. 
One, it makes a difference whether the environmental damage (D) that the 
development project will generate (or is generating) is related to the extent of the 
‘The list and many of the words are from Mernitz [5, pp. 47-501. This book and the works of 
Susskind and Lake (see [4,7-1On offer the best reviews of the process of environmental mediation and 
examples of its success. 
3 I. W. Zartman, quoted in Lake [4, p. 581. 
4Susskind [7, p. 81. 
5 We shall usually talk for brevity of “court battle,” but the same analysis would apply to a distant, 
uncertain, and arbitrary administrative or legislative decision. 
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environmental safeguarding (S) in convex fashion or not.6 By convex, I mean that 
the collection of potential safeguards can be arrayed so that they at first reduce 
environmental damage dramatically but face ever decreasing returns in this respect.7 
Not all projects can be expected to display such a relationship. It is possible that 
small values of S cannot much affect D, but at some higher value significant impact 
is realized. 
Two, it makes a difference whether the negotiation can involve transfer (or side) 
payments (P) between the parties.* A negotiated settlement usually specifies that 
the industrialist can start (or continue) operations provided that a certain amount of 
environmental safeguarding (S) is implemented. Side payments may or may not be 
involved. They may be prevented by legal or moral obstacles, by transaction costs, 
by unclear rights, by the ill-defined membership of the relevant group of “environ- 
mentalists,” or by the fear of inducing a proliferation of new claimants for such 
payments. And payments by environmentalists (i.e., P -C 0) may also be precluded 
by a free-rider disincentive if the group is large and diverse. 
Three, it makes a difference whether the dispute involves a new development with 
external environmental costs or an attempt to prevent an already operative project 
from continuing to generate its traditional environmental impacts. In the first case, 
a court victory by the industrialist means a new set of resource flows, including new 
environmental damages, while a victory by the environmentalists ensures a con- 
tinuation of the status quo. In the second case, the reverse is true: a court victory by 
the industrialist means a continuation of the status quo, while victory by the 
environmentalists implies an altered set of resource flows, including reduced en- 
vironmental damages. These differences in court outcomes provide a critically 
different backdrop to the negotiating process. Going to court (i.e., refusing to 
negotiate a settlement) means, in the first case, a potential gain and no potential loss 
for the industrialist and, in the second case, a potential gain and no potential loss 
for the environmentalists, when the outcomes are viewed in relation to the continua- 
tion of the status quo.’ 
And four, it makes a difference how much safeguarding and side payments-i.e., 
the sum of S and P-the court would impose on the industrialist should the 
industrialist lose the case. Let the court-set figures be SC and PC, respectively. Then, 
if (SC + PC) exceeds the profitability (II) of the project, the industrialist will not 
initiate the project and the environmental damage will be zero, but at the cost to the 
industrialist (and society) of the foregone profit; if (SC + PC) is less than II, 
however, the project will be undertaken, albeit at a cost in terms of environmental 
‘Both the damage (D) and the safeguards (S) can, in principle, be expressed in (real) dollar terms; I 
assume that they can be so measured in fact. Throughout, all variables refer to the present values at the 
time the project is initiated if a time stream is involved. 
‘More precisely, convexity means D’ < 0 and D” > 0, where the primes represent derivatives when 
D is written as a function of S, D(S). It is possible that D may be reduced to zero with some finite 
expenditure of S, but it seems more typical to think of D approaching some positive minimum level at 
which D’ and D” become zero. 
*We define P > 0 to be a payment by the industrialist to the environmentalists and P < 0 to be a 
payment by the cnviromnentalists to the industrialist. 
91 am ignoring here, and will throughout, any legal costs involved in the court fight or the negotiation 
(and hence the distribution of court costs between winning and losing litigants) and any risk aversion 
that might cause a preference for a negotiated solution to a court outcome of equal expected value. These 
may be, but are not necessarily, relevant to particular cases, and I want to focus on what I feel are more 
basic concerns. 
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damage (DC).1o Furthermore, if less dramatically, expectations about what the court 
might set in its determination (SC and PC) will affect the bounds of possible 
negotiated settlements. In general, higher expected values of PC and SC will make, 
ceteris paribus, the industrialist more willing to negotiate and the environmentalists 
less willing. Thus, both the likelihood and the efficiency of a negotiated outcome 
may be affected. 
From these four different kinds of attributes of environmental disputes, each with 
(at least) two different possible values, one could taxonomically examine many 
potential types of disputes. Such a path, however, would produce more tedium than 
insight. Here we will follow a shorter route. In Section 3, we closely examine a basic 
and common situation where (1) a new industrial project is proposed, (2) no side 
payments enter the negotiation, (3) the environmental damage/safeguards relation 
is convex, and (4) if the dispute goes to court, either the industrialist will proceed 
without any safeguards or the project will be completely precluded. In Section 4, we 
look more briefly at the way the negotiating process and the efficiency of the 
outcome may be altered when these basic attributes are varied. 
3. A BASIC ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE 
From the taxonomy of the previous section, let us begin by considering the 
following (“basic”) environmental conflict. An industrialist wishes to undertake a 
project that will yield private profit (II) and will cause external environmental 
damage (D). No other effects are foreseen. It would be possible to alleviate the 
damage by including costly environmental safeguards (S) in the design of the 
project, although with diminishing returns (i.e., a convex relation between D and 
S). Environmentalists are upset at the industrialist’s original plan to include no 
safeguards and threaten court action. l1 Such an action would result in either the 
industralist receiving the right to proceed as originally planned (S = 0) or the 
project being forbidden totally; the law is sufficiently vague or complex that it is 
currently unclear which result would emerge. Direct negotiation between industri- 
alist and environmentalists is being attempted, but-for some reason-this negotia- 
tion is only about the safeguards (S), with direct bribes (side payments) not being 
considered (P = 0). How likely is this negotiating effort to succeed? And if it 
succeeds, is there reason to think that the public interest will be served? 
We can look at this project from three different viewpoints, the industrialist’s, the 
environmentalist’s, and “society’s,” where this last comprises both the industrialist 
and the environmentalists in a straightforward additive way.‘* 
A. Industrialist. The project’s entrepreneur gains the excess of revenues over 
direct private costs that the project yields (II); the industrialist would also have to 
pay for any safeguards that are agreed to. Thus, the present value of the industri- 
“DC < D(0) assuming SC > 0, where Do (= D(0)) refers to the environmental damage that remains 
despite the industrialist’s originally planned level of safeguards. 
“I define the original plan as containing zero safeguards (S = 0) although industry is rarely so 
callous. More precisely, S refers throughout to uditional safeguards (i.e., beyond the industrialist’s 
originally plarmed level). 
“By this means I ignore both third-party concerns and the possibility that the industrialist and 
environmentalists are not equally valued in society’s objective function. The assumption of a single, 
defined, homogeneous envir onmental opposition group is admittedly a substantial abstraction. 
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alist’s profit (PVbJ is 
PQd=rI-S. 
The profit-seeking industrialist would prefer to set S = 0, proceed with the project, 
and earn II.13 
B. Environmentalists. The single: impact of the proposed project, from this 
group’s viewpoint, is its environmental damage;14 hence the present value to the 
environmentalists (PV,,) is 
Pv,, = -D(S). (2) 
The environmentalists would clearly prefer that the project be proscribed, or, if it is 
undertaken, that great environmental safeguards be applied, so as to m inimize D. 
Note that there are two sources of-conflict between environmentalists and in- 
dustrialist-one, whether the project should be done at all, and two, if it is done, 
how much environmental safeguarding should be implemented. 
C. Society. Since society here is literally the sum of its members, the present 
value of social profit (PV,) is 
PI’, = III - S - D(S). 
The correct social decision about this project involves two questions. First, if the 
project were to be undertaken, what would be the optimal amount of safeguarding? 
The first derivative of (3) with respect to S informs us that 
D’(S*) = -1, (4) 
where S* is the socially optimal value of S.15 This optimization at S* and D* is 
shown graphically in Fig. 1, where the dashed (minus) 4%degree line tangent to the 
solid-line D(S) curve indicates the least-cost sum of S and D. The second question 
is, if the project design were to contain the optimal safeguarding (S*), should it be 
undertaken? The answer, seen in (3), is yes if 
I-I - s* - D(S*) > 0. (5) 
In terms of Fig. 1, condition (5) is fulfilled if II, measured along the horizontal axis, 
lies to the right of the point where the dashed 45-degree line meets the axis. 
Unfortunately, this omniscient social decision-making process is usually unavail- 
able. Rather, environmentalists and the industrialist must seek a decision concem- 
ing the project in one of two ways, court battle or negotiation. 
131 assume that II > 0. 
14By think@ of this as a marginal project in the economy, we can ignore the possibility of changes in 
factor rent or consumer surplus that might accrue to environmentalists in their concomitant roles as 
factors or consumers. Notice that we thereby set aside an interesting complexity of real-world conflicts, 
where the environme-ntalists are fighting not only an industrialist but also potential employees who would 
earn higher wages and/or landowners who would realize capital gains. 
15Tbe equal sign of (4) assumes an interior solution. S* = 0 or D* = D(S*) = 0 are of course 
possible comer solutions. 
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FIGURE I 
First, consider an all-or-nothing court battle. It alternately rages and dallies for 
years, at the end of which either the industrialist receives the green light to proceed 
without safeguards or the environmentalists finally block the project. Assume that 
both industrialist and environmentalists identically perceive the probability of an 
ultimate victory by the developer as p (where 0 < p < 1) and that this probability is 
unrelated to the (economic) merits of the case. l6 The expected present values of gain 
(EPV) of the two protagonists through such a court battle are 
EPV,, = Kn (6) 
and 
EPV,, = - uDo, (7) 
respectively, where K = p (1 + r)-N, r is the discount rate, N is the expected length 
of the court battle, and all these parameters are assumed to be the same for 
industrialist and environmentalists. Notice that both uncertainty (p < 1) and delay 
((1 + r)-* < 1) operate to reduce the industrialist’s expected present value of gain 
below II. The same two factors operate in the same way to reduce the expected 
present value of environmental damage, but the damages that might eventually 
emerge are the highest possible since, if the developer wins, S = 0. 
The alternative to this court proceeding is negotiation, which entirely removes 
both uncertainty and delay. l7 Is there scope for such negotiation? The industrialist 
would prefer to incur negotiated safeguards of S, as long as the profit that remains 
after negotiation exceeds the expected profit from the court battle, i.e., if 
s, < (1 - K)fl. (8) 
16Note that identical perceptions of p do not necessarily mean correct perceptions of p-the latter 
are irrelevant to the scope for and efficiency of negotiation. We will look later in this section at the effect 
of different perceptions. Those who find the Bridlegoose-like approach to court decisions in environmen- 
tal matters excessively caustic may think of the probabilistic assumption as “simplifying”; but also be 
reminded that the law in these matters is often new and still unclear and that decisions are regularly 
made on obscure procedural grounds. 
“Of course, negotiation also takes time, but less time. Nothing important is lost by assuming it takes 
no time. 
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FIGURE 2 
Similarly, the environmentalists would prefer to negotiate as long as 
D,, < ~4, (9) 
where D, = D(S,). Inequalities (8) and (9) are graphed in Fig. 2. Figure 2a shows a 
situation in which there is scope for negotiation-both parties are better off (than 
with court battle) with any values of S, and D,, along the hatched part of the D(S) 
curve. Figure 2b shows a situation in which there is no negotiated value of S, that 
leaves both better off. 
What aspects of the environmental disputes make negotiated solutions possible, 
as in Fig. 2a, or impossible, as in Figure 2b? Clearly, the more there is to gain (II) 
or lose (Do), the more likely is a negotiated solution.” Also, the “scope” for 
compromise is increased by a more convex shape to the D(S) function. Finally a 
negotiated settlement is made more likely by a “m iddling” value of K; as either the 
environmentalists or the industrialist becomes more certain of a total and quick 
court victory, there is less “room” on the D(S) function for an acceptable 
compromise. 
As an aside to the theory, but important in fact, we should notice the effects on 
the prospects for a negotiated settlement of differing perceptions of K by the two 
parties. If environmentalists are overly optimistic about their chances of winning in 
court, or of prolonging the court battle, that lowers the xDo constraint in Figs. 2a 
and 2b and reduces the scope for negotiation. Similarly, excessive optimism by the 
industrialist moves the (1 - IC)II constraint leftward and reduces the scope for 
negotiation. One could make a case, based for example on the incentive structure 
facing the various lawyers involved, that such bias is likely to appear, at least 
initially, and that such bias will often prolong or even preclude objectively feasible 
negotiations.” Of course, risk aversion, which is ignored by the theory here but may 
be important in fact, works in the opposite direction. 
Is there any reason for thinking that an out-of-court settlement, if negotiated, will 
be socially optimal? The answer is simple: no. Inspection of Fig. 2 readily reveals 
that the marginal condition (4) for the social optimality of safeguards will not in 
general be reached by negotiation. There is nothing in the two inequalities, (8) and 
(9), that involves D’(S), and there is no reason for thinking a negotiated S, will be 
exactly that value at which the marginal optimality condition (4) is met. Indeed, as 
‘sNote that constraints (8) and (9), as drawn in Fig. 2, intersect along a straight line from point 
(0, &I) to point (l-&O). 
19See, for example of this, Michigan’s Pigeon River dispute [l]. 
136 RICHARD C. PORTER 
FIGURES 
Fig. 2a is drawn, the entire hatched region fails to include the values of D and S- 
where condition (4) is fulfilled; and, as Fig. 2b is drawn, no negotiated solution is 
feasible despite the existence of a point on the D(S) curve at which condition (4) is 
satisfied. Of course, this marginal condition (4) will not in general be reached by 
court battle either. But there is no reason for thinking that negotiation will come 
even close to achieving D’ = - 1. 
There is also no reason for expecting in general that environmental negotiation 
will be consonant with the total condition (5) for social optimality. It is easy to show 
this by counterexamples, first, of a socially profitable project that nevertheless offers 
no scope for negotiation, and second, of a socially unprofitable project that 
nevertheless offers considerable scope for negotiated approval. These two counterex- 
amples are shown, respectively, in Figs. 3a and 3b. 
In Fig. 3a, the private profit exceeds the sum of the (optimal) safeguarding and 
environmental costs. The two social optimality conditions (4) and (5) are both 
satisfied if the project proceeds with proper safeguards, S*. But the inequalities (8) 
and (9) are such that there is no scope for negotiation-no value of S,, minimally 
satisfies both parties simultaneously. Attempts at negotiation are doomed, and the 
fate of the project will be determined in court. Why does negotiation fail? Algebrai- 
cally, in Fig. 3a, it is the low value of K that does itm; either the chances of the 
environmentalists in court are very good (i.e., low p) or the court battle promises to 
be a long one (i.e., high N). As a result, the environmentalists’ minimally acceptable 
S,, is larger than the industrialist is willing to concede. 
In Fig. 3b, a different example is illustrated, where a socially undeshable project 
may nevertheless be implemented after negotiations between industrialist and 
environmentalists. Even with the optimal level of safeguards (S*), the indirect 
environmental costs, S* + D*, exceed the direct private profit, II, and the project 
should be rejected. But when the court is likely to decide for the industrialist (i.e., 
when K is high), there is scope for a negotiated approval of the project. One such 
value of K is incorporated into Fig. 3b, and the hatched region of the D(S) curve 
mTo see tbis, draw a straight line from DO to II. A sizable potion of that line falls above the D(S) 
curve. A value of I( that leads to a point on this line above and to the right of the D(S) curve would 
leave scope for a negotiated settlement. 
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shows the range of mutually acceptable negotiated levels of safeguards.‘l How can 
this perverse result come about? Everybody seems to be better off as a result of the 
negotiation despite the economic inefficiency of the project! But recall that the 
choice is not between a negotiated project and no project at all or between a 
negotiated project and a project with no safeguards, all according to the ownership 
of rights (a la Coase [2]), but between a negotiated project and an uncertain court 
battle. And in court, in the case shown in Fig. 3b, not only is a quick victory for the 
developer likely (i.e., high K) but also the environmental damage that would follow 
such a victory is very high (i.e., high D,,). 
In summary to this point, there is no reason to expect socially efficient results 
from environmental negotiation when it occurs under threat of an alternative, 
uncertain, time-consuming means of decision-making that is itself not necessarily 
socially efficient. Potentially good projects may not find their successful way 
through the negotiations, and surely bad projects may be approved through negoti- 
ated settlement.22 Moreover, nothing in the negotiating process ensures that the 
optimal level of environmental safeguards will be arrived at. The negotiated settle- 
ment will obviously be better, for industrialist, for environmentalists, and for 
society, than the expected courtroom result, but there is no intrinsic assurance that 
it will be better than the actual court outcome. 
4. VARIATIONS ON THE BASIC DISPUTE 
Three variations on the “basic” environmental dispute will be examined in turn: 
(1) the possibility of side payments is introduced; (2) a non-convex damage function 
is considered; and (3) an alternative, less extreme than all-or-nothing, courtroom 
outcome is explored.23 
A. Side payments. When the various legal and economic barriers to side pay- 
ments can be overcome, a new degree of freedom is introduced into the negotiation 
process. Between the industrialist who wishes to initiate a privately profitable 
project and environmentalists who object to the concomitant environmental damage, 
the alternative to court battle is a negotiation that determines two things, the 
amount of environmental safeguarding (S,) and the size of the side payment ( P,,).24 
Except for the possibility of side payments, we stay with the “basic” case of 
Section 3 with a convex environmental damage function and an all-or-nothing 
courtroom possibility in which the project will be either barred entirely or launched 
with no safeguards at all. The expected present values through the court battle are 
thus the same as in the “basic” case of Section 3, Eqs. (6) and (7). The alternative to 
%ll these negotiated values of S, are less than S* for the K shown in Fig. 3b, but that is not 
necessarily the case for all lower values of I(. S,, > S* is possible although, of course, S, > II is not 
possible. 
“By “potentially good,” I mean one that would be socially profitable if the optimal level of 
safeguards were adapted-i.e., when both conditions (4) and (5) are met. By “surely bad,” I mean one 
that would be socially unprofitable even with the optimal level of safeguards-i.e., condition (5) is not 
met even when condition (4) is met. 
23Variation on the fourth characteristic enumerated in Section 2, whether the dispute is over a 
proposed or existing project, yields no interesting information. The potentials for negotiation and the 
caveats about efficiency depend on the same factors in the same ways. 
*This payment could be in either direction, i.e., P,, $0. (Recall our convention: P,, > 0 means a 
payment by the industrialist to the environmentalists, Z’, < 0 a payment in the reverse direction.) 
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this court battle is a negotiated settlement, whereby the industrialist ends up with a 
present value of II - S, - P, and the environmentalists with a present value of 
P,,- 0,. 
No algebra is needed to see that any negotiated solution must achieve marginal 
efficiency. Until D' = - 1, there is always room to make both parties better off by 
adjusting S, toward S* and appropriately altering the side payment, P,,. Thus, the 
question whether successful negotiation is possible reduces to the question whether 
there is a side payment at S* (and D*) that betters each party, relative to its EPV 
from court resolution. Such betterment requires 
and 
n-s*-P,>Kn 
-D* + P, > -K& 
04 
05) 
or, combining and rearranging, 
D* - KD,, < P,, < (1 - K)n - s*. (16) 
Some-possibly positive, possibly negative-values of P, will satisfy (16) provided 
that 
D* + S* < K& + (1 - K)n. (17) 
Clearly, from (17), socially profitable projects are negotiable.25 It would appear at 
first glance that at least some socially unprofitable projects are also negotiable. For 
example, consider D,, > D* + S* > II and K = 1 (or close to it); condition (17) is 
met, despite the undesirable nature of the project. But then there remains further 
scope for bettering each disputant by just not doing the project-environmentalists 
will be better off with a negotiated settlement in which the industrialist receives the 
larger of the EPVi*, of KII (Eq. (6)) or the negotiated profit of II - S* - P, 
(inequality (14)) from the environmentalists in return for withdrawing the project.26 
The possibility of side payments leads the negotiation to the efficient result, 
marginally and totally. But recall that this conclusion requires for generality that 
there be no restriction on the sign or size of the side payment. Once side payments 
cannot be arranged from environmentalists to industrialists (i.e., P z 0 only) or 
must be “modest” in size, we begin to move toward the “basic” kind of dispute 
(Section 3), and the possibility begins to emerge that bad projects will be negotiated 
successfully or that good projects will fail to be negotiated.27 This suggests two 
things. First, environmental negotiators should be urged to consider side payments 
as well as safeguards. And second, where no side payments occur in a successfully 
negotiated settlement, we should worry about the possibility that constraints on side 
payments have prevented a socially desirable result. 
"D* + S* < II (definition of social profitability) and D* + S* < Do (definition of least-cost 
safeguards); so D* + S* must be less than a weighted average (by K and 1 - K) of the two. 
26This is seen most easily by noting that not doing the project at all recaptures the project’s social 
losses, S* + D* - II, which is the pie to be divided between the two. 
27Linking two disputes together for negotiation provides a kind of possibility of side payment-giv- 
ing up one to get the other-but such lumpy side payments do not necessarily achieve socially efficient 
outcomes [6]. 
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FIGURE 4 
B. Non-convex damage function. We turn now to the project whose environmen- 
tal damage is non-convex, and for simplicity we will consider the extreme version of 
such non-convexity that is pictured in Figs. 4a and 4b. If no safeguards are taken 
the damage will be D,,, and the only safeguarding available is some indivisible 
activity that costs S, and entirely alleviates the damage. In Fig. 4a, the safeguard 
cost (Se) exceeds the private profit (II) of the project, while in Fig. 4b it is less. 
Otherwise, the dispute is similar to the “basic” case: the project is proposed; if it 
goes to court, the industrialist will either be permitted to proceed without safeguards 
or be barred entirely from the undertaking; and side payments do not enter the 
negotiation. 
The conditions under which negotiating efforts have scope for success are readily 
derived. Court battle yields, as in the “basic” case, Eqs. (6) and (7). Negotiation 
improves each party’s lot if, as in the “basic” case, inequalities (8) and (9) hold. 
Depending on the value of K, these constraints (8) and (9) form a rectangular 
feasible area bounded on the south and west by the axes and with a northeastern 
vertex somewhere along the dashed line from D, to II. 
In Fig. 4a, no negotiation is feasible-a court battle will surely ensue. And yet, if 
II > D,, the project is socially efficient; negotiation cannot promote it, and the 
court can offer no more than a probability of its eventual realization. 
In Fig. 4b, on the other hand, there is a possibility of successful negotiation if K is 
low enough that the feasible rectangle is bounded to the northeast by a point 
between points c and II. ** The profit then is sufficiently great that the industrialist 
would rather spend the S, now than risk the loss of II later. The negotiation is 
efficient in that it assures the launching of a desirable project (II > S,). But it does 
not assure the correct amount of safeguarding; the safeguarding should be zero or S, 
according as S, 3 De, while any negotiation always leads to S,. 
Thus, non-convexity poses a hurdle to negotiation, perhaps insurmountable 
without side payments. 29 Bad projects cannot be successfully negotiated, but good 




29Tbe interested reader can easily show that the efficient outcome always emerges here if uncon- 
strained side payments are possible-profitable projects will be negotiated and with the correct choice of 
safeguards. 
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projects may either fail to be negotiated altogether or fail to be negotiated with the 
correct level of safeguards. 
C. Alternative courtroom outcomes. So far, we have been assuming that the 
threatened court encounter, should it occur, will result in one of two rather extreme 
outcomes. Either the project will proceed, totally unencumbered by environmental 
safeguards, or it will be irretrievably rejected, regardless of its unexplored potential 
for safeguards. Courts need not make such extreme decisions, although their 
adversarial character and procedural priorities rarely make them ideal locations for 
finely tuned efficiency decisions. In this section, we will examine two less extreme 
outcomes, namely, where the court will ultimately permit the project but will set 
different degrees of environmental safeguards depending on who wins the case.3o If 
the industrialist wins, the project will be approved with safeguards (S,), and if the 
environmentalists win, the project will be approved with a different set of safeguards 
(S,l). The interesting case is that in which 0 < S, < S; < II. 
Consider a newly proposed project, a convex environmental damage function, 
and the impossibility of side payments in negotiations. Then the courtroom expecta- 
tions are 
and 
EPVi, = K( ~ - S,) + K’( ~ - So) (18) 
EPV,, = -KD, - KID;, 09) 
where K’ = (1 - p)(l + r)-“, the present value of the probability of an environ- 
mentalist victory in court, and where D, and 0,’ are the environmental damages 
that follow with safeguards, S, and &‘, respectively. A negotiated solution is 
possible if 
and 
s, < (1 - K - K’)n + KS, + K’S; (20) 
D, < KD, + K’D;. (21) 
To keep things less messy, ignore the fact that K + K’ < 1 and assume that they do 
add to one (because either r or N is “very small”). Then the conditions (20) and 
(21) for negotiation become, respectively, 
and 
s, < KS, + (1 - K)S; (22) 
D,, < KD, + (1 - K)&. (23) 
The feasible rectangle for negotiations is thus bounded on the northeast by a point 
along the dashed line in Fig. 5 (from the point (S,, 0,) to the point (S,‘, D,‘))-ex- 
actly where will depend on the magnitude of K. It is clear that, for any 0 < K c 1 
and for any 0 < S, < S,l < II, there are values of S, (and hence 0,) that can be 






SC 5; lr S 
negotiated between the parties so that each is better off than with the expected court 
result.31 
Thus, when it is known beforehand that the project will survive the court struggle 
although with an uncertain amount of environmental safeguarding, there is alwuj~ 
scope for negotiation. 32 There is, however, no assurance that the negotiation will 
lead to an efficient result, The marginal condition (D’ = - 1) will be met only by 
coincidence, bad as well as good projects may be successfully negotiated,33 and one 
(but not both) of the possible court outcomes may be socially superior to the 
negotiated outcome. Judicial finetuning of the safeguarding is only a positive step 
forward if the court-set levels bracket the socially correct level (i.e., SC < S* K S,l). 
And increasing the likelihood of negotiated settlement is no virtue if the entire 
project is intrinsically bad (i.e., lT - 5’ - D* < 0). 
5. SUMMARY 
There is often scope for negotiation over environmental disputes, especially when 
the alternative is an uncertain, delayed, ah-or-nothing courtroom resolution. But 
such negotiation does not necessarily lead to a socially correct decision, either in 
terms of the projects undertaken or in terms of the extent of the environmental 
safeguarding embodied in them. only if sidepayment possibilities exist and are 
fully exploited can we be certain that environmental negotiation will promote 
socially desirable projects and that successful negotiation of undesirable projects 
will be impossible. Without side payments, the negotiating process may fail in any 
of three ways: (1) approval of socially bad projects may be negotiated; (2) 
inefficient levels-either excessive or inadequate-of environmental safeguarding 
may be established through negotiation; or (3) socially good projects may not be 
negotiable. Negotiation under threat of court battle is no social panacea. 
“This same conclusion is readily shown to hold, a fortiori, if x + L’ < 1. 
32Provided, as inqection of Fig. 5 makes clear, that tbe damage function is convex. 
33Projects are *good” or “bad” according as II - Dn - S,, 2 0. S, will be less than TI, but D, + S,, 
may be greater. 
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